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Increasing Role of Nuclear weapon free Zones:
Challenges and Opportunities*
By Michael Hamel-Green (Australia)
In September-October 2006 the world witnessed two separatebut very significant events for the future direction of nuclearproliferation, and how the international community might respond
to proliferation and the threat of nuclear war.
One received huge international publicity - provoking almost
universal condemnation and outrage in the international community,
especially from the Western nuclear powers. The other was praised by
many in the arms control and disarmament community inside and outside
the UN, but virtually ignored by the mainstream media, and actively
opposed by the Western nuclear powers.
The first event was the underground test conducted by North Korea
on October 9th 2006, viewed by the North Korean regime as a measure
designed “for bolstering its war deterrent for self-defence” in the context
of what it perceives as a “US threat” and “hostile policy”1, but perceived
by both other regional states and the international community as a highly
destabilizing move that could trigger a regional nuclear arms race, since
both South Korea and Japan have the technical capabilities to rapidly
acquire nuclear weapons.
The second event was at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on September
8th 2006, where the five Central Asia states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed a treaty to establish
the first nuclear weapon-free zone wholly located in the Northern
* Paper prepared for IPPNW/North Asia NWFZ Regional Meeting June 21-22 2007,
Ulan Bator, Mongolia
1 DPRK, “DRG Foreign Ministry Spokesman on US Moves Concerning Its Nuclear
Test”, KCNA, 11/10/06
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Hemisphere2.2 The ceremony took place in the highly symbolic location
of one of the former Soviet Union’s most important nuclear test sites,
and was the culmination of nine years of negotiation that overcame both
internal differences and many (though not all) external nuclear weapon
state reservations. It effectively denuclearises a highly strategic region
that has the nuclear materials (uranium and even stocks of plutonium),
research facilities, and previous nuclear experience and technical
expertise, to develop nuclear weapons. As Parish and Potter note in a
recent analysis of the new zone:
“To a greater extent than the previous NWFZs, the one in Central
Asia will showcase a commitment to nuclear disarmament by a group of
states which previously had nuclear weapons on their territory and
continue to live in a nuclear-armed neighborhood. Surrounded by
Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, Indian and Israeli nuclear weapons, and
housing Russian and U.S. military bases, the new zone will serve as a
powerful example of non-proliferation – an important antidote and
positive counter-example to Iranian and North Korean nuclear
brinkmanship. It will also be the first NWFZ located entirely in the
northern hemisphere.”3
Despite the extraordinary achievement of five new nations, assisted
by the United Nations and non-proliferation NGOs in successfully
negotiating such a treaty in the face of ambivalence, obstructionism and
even outright resistance by various of the nuclear powers, and despite
the alleged concern by major powers and media opinion leaders about
nuclear weapons spreading and falling into the wrong hands, there was
a deafening silence in the international media about a major non-
proliferation initiative that points the way for other regions, not least
Northeast Asia. It seems the preoccupation with coercive and pre-
emptive approaches to controlling proliferation favoured by the Bush
Administration has blinded many in the media to the possibilities and
realities of cooperative regional approaches to reducing nuclear threats.
2 UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, “Central
Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ)”, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs
website, disarmament.un.org/rpcd/centasia.htm, 2006.
3 Parrish, Scott & Potter, William, “Central Asian States Establish Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone Despite U.S.Opposition”, CNS Research Story, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, CNS website, cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/, September 5 2006
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Progress in regional denuclearization
There has, in fact, been steady, if slow, progression in regional
denuclearisation since the first nuclear weapon free zone in a populated
area was established in Latin America in 1967. The Nobel prize winning
architect of that zone, the Mexican diplomat, Alfonso Garcia Robles,
argued that not only would such zones contribute to reducing horizontal
proliferation in specific regions, but also contribute to global nuclear
disarmament through gradually diminishing the areas of the world for
which nuclear weapons are viewed as a necessary part of national or
regional security.
Much of Robles’ vision has already been achieved. Almost all of
the Southern Hemisphere is now covered by regional nuclear-free or
nuclear weapon-free zones, including the Latin American NWFZ
(Tlatelolco Treaty, 1967), South Pacific NWFZ (Rarotonga Treaty,
1985), Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty, 1996) African NWFZ
(Pelindaba Treaty, 1996), with the two latter NWFZs extending into
the Northern Hemisphere. The new Central Asian NWFZ
(Semipalatinsk, 2006) expands the NWFZ concept to a significant
regional grouping wholly in the Northern Hemisphere. No nuclear
weapons may be developed or stationed on land anywhere in the regions
covered by these zones, although nuclear weapons transit at sea is still
permitted by most of the zones. At the same time, the zones seek to
constrain vertical proliferation in the form of nuclear threats from the
existing nuclear powers by seeking international recognition through
the UN and binding protocols from the relevant nuclear states providing
negative security assurances (NSAs) in the form of undertakings not
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against zonal members.
Other zones have been proposed for such regions as Central Europe,
Northern Europe, the Baltic region, the Middle East, South Asia and
Northeast Asia, but have so far not advanced, either because of lack of
regional consensus, or due to the opposition of major powers.
Nevertheless, there has been strong support from the international
community and many of the relevant regional states for the Middle East
and South Asia NWFZ proposals, and for at least the denuclearisation
of the Korean Peninsula within the Northeast Asia region.
We tend to be preoccupied with proliferation bad news stories –
the setbacks posed by the 1998 Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests and
now the 2006 North Korean nuclear tests, in each case confirming the
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long suspected nuclear weapon capabilities of these countries. But the
non-proliferation contribution of regional, and individual state NWFZs
(such as Mongolia and New Zealand) has been less well appreciated.
The case of the very first NWFZ, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, is
instructive, particularly since the zone was originally negotiated in a
regional context, like Northeast Asia, where there were tensions between
major nuclear-capable regional states. Brazil and Argentina were
involved in nuclear competition, and initially did not assume active
membership of the treaty; however, after lengthy negotiations, they
eventually assumed their full obligations under the Treaty in 1994-95,
following the advent of civilian governments in both countries, and
increasing bilateral cooperation during the 1980s4. The Treaty most
certainly played a regional role in establishing, promoting and maintaining
legally binding non-proliferation norms, providing for region-wide
verification and compliance mechanisms, and improving security from
external nuclear threats by creating a mechanism for negative security
assurances from the nuclear powers. In the latter case, all five nuclear
powers have now signed and ratified undertakings not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against members of the zone. The Treaty has
also provided a number of other regional security benefits in the form of
providing a regional forum on nuclear and arms control issues, improving
transparency on nuclear and arms control issues, and providing means
of promoting arms control and disarmament in UN and other
international forums (as for example treaty members’ role in hosting the
2005 Tlatelolco Conference of NWFZ zonal states).
More generally, NWFZs have served to address a number of non-
proliferation and disarmament objectives. In terms of horizontal
proliferation, they have dramatically reduced the areas of potential
nuclear weapon proliferation and thereby made the remaining
proliferation problems somewhat more manageable. They also serve as
a legal buffer against the potential collapse of central non-proliferation
regimes, although such a collapse might in turn lead to abrogation of
regional agreements as well, depending on the regional circumstances.
Further, they provide normative and legally binding means for ensuring
4 For a detailed discussion of the changing stances of Brazil and Argentina, and the
role of the Tlatelolco Treaty, see Reiss, Mitchell, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries
Constrain Thei r Nuclear Capabilities, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press/John Hopkins
University Press, Washington DC, 1995, pp.64-66
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that regional states adhere to more universal agreements and control
systems, such as IAEA safeguards, thereby serving to fill regional gaps
in some non-proliferation agreements (as, for example, in the
encouragement of such Latin American NPT-hold out states as Brazil,
Argentina and Cuba to sign up to the NPT and IAEA safeguards).
NWFZs have also reduced the potential fields of use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons by states already possessing nuclear weapons. In the
absence of legal binding non-use assurances by the nuclear powers to
non-nuclear states, regional NWFZs have so far been the only means
for securing such guarantees, although in the case of the SEANFZ and
the new CANWFZ, most of the nuclear powers have not yet signed up,
or even ratified the necessary protocols.5
In the case of negative security guarantees, it could be argued that
there are no certainties here since only three of the existing zones have
secured such guarantees from the nuclear powers, and some have signed
but not yet ratified. However, the process of gaining such guarantees is,
in itself, a lengthy negotiation process. Even in the case of the LANWFZ,
which now has guarantees from all of the P5 nuclear powers, these were
secured only after years of diplomatic negotiation and pressure through
the UN General Assembly. In this case, it would be premature to assume
that the SEANWFZ and the newest CANWFZ will not be able to secure
such guarantees; rather it will depend on the continuing negotiations
and international pressures for the P5 to sign the relevant protocols.
Challenges
Despite the obvious progress in establishing regional NWFZs, there
are formidable challenges to further regional initiatives. These include:
regional conflicts and tensions, especially in the Middle East, South Asia
and Northeast Asia; existing nuclear proliferation within the region;
the nature or availability of regional forums for discussing and negotiating
regional security issues; nuclear weapon state policies and resistance to
specific zone initiatives; developing sufficient political will and civil
society mobilization behind the proposals; developing zonal initiatives
5 For fuller discussions of the security benefits and limitations of the existing zones,
see Hamel-Green, Michael, Regional Initiatives on Nuclear- and WMD-Free Zones, United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2005, pp.3-12; and Parrish, Scott
& Preez, Jean Du, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Still a Useful Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation Tool?, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2005, pp.2-3.
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adapted to the changing nature of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery; and ensuring adequate control, compliance and
verification mechanisms as part of zonal arrangements.
The most obvious challenge to further regional denuclearisation is
the existence of severe regional conflicts or distrust, even though such
conflicts make such denuclearization initiatives all the more urgent if a
future nuclear catastrophe is to be averted. The three regions that stand
out as having such conflicts are the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast
Asia. In the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israel and Iraq conflicts are
continuing to rage, and there is a gathering storm over Iran’s intention
to undertake large-scale uranium enrichment, with consequent
implications for developing a nuclear weapons capability. In response
to the long-standing Middle East NWFZ proposal, supported by most
members of the UN, Israel does not oppose the proposal in principle
but insists there must be peace settlements with the Palestinians, and its
Arab neighbours before it is willing to enter into negotiations on a
MENWFZ or the related Egyptian proposal of a ME Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ). Middle East developments are also
beginning to spill over into other regions, with Russia and America in
tension over American plans to deploy missile defence systems in Poland
and other European countries, ostensibly in defence against Iranian
nuclear-armed missiles.
While the Israeli position presents the resolution of regional conflicts
as an insuperable precondition to regional denuclearisation agreements,
there are staged or sequenced approaches that would protect the security
of all parties at every stage, and, might, as envisaged by the UN Experts’
Study of the issue, involve initial confidence-building measures (regional
test ban, IAEA safeguards’ acceptance, accession to NPT); nuclear
weapon state advance negative nuclear security assurances; declarations
of existing nuclear materials; extended negotiations on a regional NWFZ;
positive security assurances to the parties from external powers; and
development of effective regional verification systems.6
In South Asia, the long standing conflict between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir has been one factor that has stood in the way of regional
denuclearisation, although in the past India-China tensions and rivalry
played a critical part in India’s initial acquisition of nuclear weapons and
6 UN Document A/45/435, UN, New York, 1990; also see Prawitz, Jan and Leonard,
James, A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2004
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remains a justification for retaining them. The 1998 tests conducted by
both India and Pakistan demonstrated their respective nuclear weapon
capabilities and disregard for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and
served to highlight the potential risk of a South Asian accidental nuclear
war, or one triggered by a regional conflict. The region has also been
the source of export of proliferation expertise and equipment through
the clandestine network of assistance to such countries as Libya, North
Korea and nuclear war, or Iran coordinated by the then head of Pakistan’s
nuclear program, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, during the 1990s.
In Northeast Asia, the major foci of concern and conflict have been
North Korea’s development of missile and nuclear capabilities in the
context of long standing encirclement by US military and air bases in
South Korea dating back to the Korean War, potential DPRK nuclear-
weapon-related exports to other regions, and unresolved tensions and
conflicts between the two Koreas and Japan dating back to the Second
World War. North Korea’s underground testing of a nuclear weapon in
October 2006 and continued testing of missiles in regional waters have
proved major setbacks for the on-again off-again Six-Party talks aimed
at resolving the nuclear issues, although a further promising agreement
was struck in February 2007, and may still be implemented.
In all three of these regions, the challenges posed by regional
conflicts and tensions have been exacerbated by (a) long standing, or
new, nuclear weapon proliferation in some of the countries of the region;
(b) potential nuclear threats by external nuclear weapon states; and (c)
the absence of effective regional forums or organizations for discussion
and negotiation of arms control and disarmament issues.
In the case of the Middle East, Israel is believed to have acquired
nuclear weapons in 1966-67, with two nuclear weapon devices on
operational alert as early as the Six-Day 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The
Israeli possession of nuclear weapons evidently failed to deter Arab
countries in launching the 1973 War, nor Saddam Hussein in firing
missiles at Israel during the Second Gulf War, nor most recently
Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel during the 2006 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, yet serves as an incentive to other regional states, particularly
Iran, to develop a nuclear capability in response (which would then
retrospectively serve to “justify” the Israeli nuclear capability as a claimed
deterrent). However, Israeli possession of nuclear weapons, and the
security that Israelis rightly or wrongly perceive it as bringing to their
11Number 14, 2007
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country’s continued existence, means that any progress on NWFZ would
need to address Israeli security concerns through international and great
power positive and negative security guarantees, and effective and
intrusive regional and international verification and compliance
mechanisms.
In relation to nuclear threats posed by external nuclear powers,
some Middle East regional states may well have had cause to be
concerned by reports that the US placed its nuclear forces on alert during
the 1973 war; and, more recently, by Seymour Hersh’s April 2006 report
that both the US Defence Science Board and the Pentagon were
supporting the use of tactical B61 bunker-busting nuclear weapons on
Iran if Iran continued on its current course of developing enrichment
facilities and the means to produce nuclear weapons.7 This perceived
external nuclear weapon threat by nuclear powers against non-nuclear
regional states underlines the importance of advance negative security
assurances as a first step in negotiating a MENWFZ.
The further barrier in the Middle East is the lack of a regional
organization or forum for negotiating regional security and nuclear
issues. The League of Arab states partially fills the role but does not, of
course, include Israel and Iran; it has, however, strongly supported the
MENWFZ and worked intensively to develop modalities and approaches
that would be acceptable to all parties8. The “Quartet” of the US, Russia,
European Union, and UN, which is currently seeking to facilitate a
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement, could also, potentially, play a role
in facilitating a regional forum that would begin addressing regional
nuclear issues.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan have long standing nuclear weapon
programmes, with India having first tested a nuclear weapon in 1974,
and both India and Pakistan testing in 1998. The Indian program began
in the early 1960s while the Pakistan program was started in 1972. An
important extra regional nuclear threat from India’s point of view is
China, which first tested nuclear weapons in 1964, now possesses over
7 Hersh, Seymour, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran
from getting the bomb?, New Yorker, April 8 2006.
8 See, for example, the reports from the joint League of Arab States and UNIDIR
2003 Conference on “Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle
East” in UNIDIR, Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle
East: Global Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences, UNIDIR, Geneva,
UN, 2004.
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400 nuclear weapons, and, in the past, has had border disputes with
India. While South Asia does have a regional organization in the form
of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), this
has been heavily dominated by India, although, more recently, the January
2004 SAARC meeting did serve to facilitate a bilateral Indian- Pakistan
dialogue process on nuclear issues, which led to an agreed joint
moratorium on further nuclear tests and establishment of a nuclear issues
hotline between the two governments.
In Northeast Asia, proliferation has already occurred in the form
of North Korea demonstrating its nuclear weapon possession in its 2006
underground nuclear test. In the past, South Korea has undertaken
nuclear weapons development and research, but has so far not proceeded
to actual nuclear weapon possession. Japan is still bound by its non-
nuclear principles, but has a large stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium,
and has the technical capability to move to nuclear weapon possession
at very short notice. If the present negotiations to denuclearize North
Korean and the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks are
unsuccessful, there would be some incentive for Japan and South Korea
to move to nuclear possession to “deter” North Korea, depending on
Japanese and South Korean perceptions of how effective US security
guarantees would be under their respective bilateral alliances. In terms
of extra regional nuclear presence, the US for a long time deployed
tactical nuclear weapons at its bases in South Korea, but has now
removed them. However, perceptions of a continued nuclear and/or
conventional threat from the US continue to influence North Korean
policy, and provide an incentive for the regime to develop its own nuclear
forces as a “deterrent” against an Iraqi-style invasion. As in the case of
the Middle East, there is no Northeast Asian regional body that can act
as a regular forum for negotiating nuclear and arms control issues.
However, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has played a useful role,
at least in relation to the discussion of confidence-building measures for
the wide region, while the Six-Party Talks involving North Korea, China,
South Korea, Japan, Russia and China recently agreed at its February
2007 meeting to establish, inter alia, a working group on a “Northeast
Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”.9
9 US State Department, “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement”,
13th February 2007, US State Department website www.state.gov; also on Acronym
Institute website, www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0702/doc.01.htm
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Beyond the challenges posed by regional conflicts, existing
proliferation within a region, and the lack of effective regional
organizations and negotiation forums, a key challenge for NWFZ
establishment is the attitude of the nuclear weapon states, particularly
the P5 (US, Russia, China, UK and France).
While all P5 nuclear weapon states have in the past voiced in
principle support for NWFZs, and all have now signed up to the Latin
American, South Pacific and African NWFZs (with some ratifications
still outstanding), they have been very selective and ambivalent about
supporting some specific zones, despite their expressed concerns about
non-proliferation. In many cases, they have put their own perceived
short-term nuclear and military interests ahead of the need to prevent
whole regions going nuclear, or denuclearize existing regions where
proliferation has already occurred.
This is especially so in the case of the United States, which, even
under the Clinton Administration, did not sign up to the Southeast Asian
NWFZ, citing concerns about its potential restrictions on US transit
rights through the zone and EEZs, despite the US having already removed
tactical nuclear weapons from its surface vessels and aircraft (although
it should be noted that the Clinton Administration was faced with a
Republic controlled Congress in its later years). US ambivalence
intensified under the Bush Administration, which under Ambassador
John Bolton’s guidance, voted against 26 arms control and disarmament
resolutions supported by the overwhelming majority of the international
community at the 2006 UN General Assembly, while abstaining on a
further two, and supporting only three. In the last year of the Clinton
Administration, the US opposed or abstained from 28% of internationally
supported arms control resolutions at the UN; by contrast, in 2006,
under the Bush Administration, the US opposed or abstained from 90%
of the internationally supported arms control resolutions. Amongst the
internationally endorsed resolutions resisted by America were: support
for the establishment of the Central Asia NWFZ (previously supported
by the US at the 2004 General Assembly); support for a NWF Southern
Hemisphere; convening of a Fourth Special Session of the General
Assembly on disarmament; and the promotion of multilateralism in the
area of disarmament and non-proliferation.
Extraordinarily, the only countries to vote against the key universal
measure to constrain further nuclear proliferation - the Comprehensive
14
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Test Ban Treaty - were America and North Korea. If North Korea is
deemed part of the “Evil Empire” because of its determination to acquire
and test nuclear weapons, then the US has seemingly allied itself with
that empire in seeking to obstruct the key international treaty designed
to limit further proliferation – presumably putting its own Pentagon
wish list for testing new or modernized types of nuclear weapons ahead
of global non-proliferation priorities in such critical regions as the Middle
East, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.
The contradictory nature of US policy towards NWFZs is even
more apparent in its current attitude towards the recently signed Central
Asian NWFZ Treaty. Considering Central Asia’s extensive involvement
in nuclear weapon programs of the former Soviet Union, its abundant
supplies of uranium, and facilities and technical expertise in processing
nuclear fuels, its possession of at least 3 metric tons of weapons grade
plutonium at a shutdown breeder reactor in Kazakhstan, and its relatively
new polities, with significant potential for instabilities and civil unrest,
the US stance seems both illogical and counterproductive. As Jayantha
Dhanapala, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs, noted,
the zone’s establishment is “all the more significant given that this region
once reportedly hosted over 700 tactical nuclear weapons — not to
mention the over 1,400 former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons that
Kazakhstan returned to Russia before joining the NPT in 1995”.10
From both a regional and global non-proliferation perspective, the
need to secure this region from developing nuclear weapons, or
exporting fissionable materials to other parts of the world, could scarcely
be more urgent.
The C5 regional states spent nine years negotiating the treaty, with
the support and expert consultative assistance of the UN and non-
proliferation NGOs (such as the Monterey Institute) and extensive
consultations with all the nuclear weapon states, especially America and
Russia.
At an initial September 1997 conference in Tashkent to establish
the zone, the US delegation to the conference was, indeed, very positive
about the non-proliferation benefits of the zone:
“The US welcomes the desire of the states of Central Asia to
undertake steps toward regional cooperation and security. Careful,
10 Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs,
September 30, 2006, cited in Parish & Potter, op.cit
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deliberate actions that foster regional security will benefit Central Asian
states and the international community as a whole. A Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone, which can make an important contribution to enhancing
regional security, is one element of a regional security system…Another
area vital to regional and global security is preventing the spread of
nuclear material and across borders; enhanced export control regimes
and increased security and protection of nuclear materials, especially in
the Newly Independent States of Asia and Europe, can greatly enhance
regional and global non-proliferation regimes. We are encouraged by
these regional developments and seek to encourage them when
appropriate by sharing our arms control experiences and providing
technical assistance when asked.”11
In subsequent years, the US both under the Clinton Administration
and even in the initial years of the Bush Administration voted in support
of the CANWFZ at successive UN General Assembly, as did the other
Western nuclear powers. However, in 2006, the United States not only
refused to sign the treaty but actively lobbied against it at the 2006 UN
General Assembly, with at least some success with its fellow nuclear
club members, Britain and France, who similarly voted against the zone.
So why did the US suddenly conclude in 2006 that all the CANWFZ
non-proliferation benefits it had itself identified in 1997 were now to be
dismissed, and the zone actually opposed?
At one stage of the negotiations, the US seemed fearful that Iran
might join the zone, since the initial draft treaty included the potential
expansion to regional neighbours, which include both Iran and Mongolia.
Having Iran locked into a binding NWFZ treaty with mandatory standard
and additional safeguards (such as the CANWFZ treaty contains) might
not seem such an undesirable thing, considering international worries
over Iran going nuclear, but it seems the US was worried that, in the
short term, Iran would simply use membership of such a zone to promote
its peaceful intentions while secretly continuing to develop nuclear
weapons. In the end, the Central Asia States listened to the US concerns
on this, and deleted the clause referring to potential expansion of
membership. This was a pity, since neighbouring Mongolia, which in
11 US Delegation to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Conference,
“Remarks to the Conference”, 15-16th September 1997, US State Department, available
on NTI/Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute website,
www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/shared/canwfz/usstate.htm.
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1992 had already declared itself a national NWFZ and received
international recognition of this status12, would have been a welcome
addition to the zone, and created a symbolic nuclear-weapon-free swathe
across the heart of the Asian landmass.
Despite this concession to US concerns, the US continued to be so
deeply perturbed by the treaty as to vote against it and put pressure on
its friends to do likewise. The problem from the US point of view lay
principally in Article 12 of the treaty which states:
“This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties
under other international treaties which they may have concluded prior
to the date of the entry into force of this Treaty. The parties shall take all
necessary measures for effective implementation of the purposes and
objectives of this Treaty in accordance with the main principles contained
therein.”13
The US concern lies in the fact that several of the Central Asian
States are members of the 1992 Tashkent Treaty with Russia under which
the parties agree to provide “all necessary assistance, including military
assistance” in response to aggression. This, on the US view, can be
interpreted as potentially embracing the possibility of nuclear weapon
assistance, which would then be incompatible with the principles of a
NWFZ treaty. From a legal point of view, Jozef Goldblat has observed
that, in fact, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article
30) requires that an “earlier treaty” dealing with the same subject matter
“applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those
of the later treaty”.14 But, irrespective of the correct legal interpretation
of Article 12, the US itself has previously had no difficulties in signing
up to NWFZs in which the US itself is a member of military alliances
with zonal states, as, for example, the SPNFZ where the US has a bilateral
military alliance with Australia in the form of the ANZUS Treaty.
Further, its own frequently reiterated “Seven Criteria” for assessing
whether a zone should receive US support includes the criterion that
“the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security
12 Enkhsaikhan, Jargalsaihan, “Central Asia-Future Perspectives” in Alves, Pericles
Gasparini & Cipollone, Daiana Belinda, (eds.), Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st
Century, UNIDIR, United Nations, Geneva, 1997, pp.96-97
13 Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, “Text of the CANWFZ”, CNSwebsite,
cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060905_canwfz.pdf
14 Goldblat, Jozef, “The Treaty of Semipalatinsk has been signed”, UNIDIR & GIPRI,
January 24 2007.
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arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security or
otherwise abridge the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense guaranteed in the UN Charter.”15 It should also be noted that
the Central Asian states, aware of US concerns, explicitly included the
second sentence in Article 12 referring to effective implementation of
the zone principles, which Protocol signatories, such as Russia are also
bound to respect under Article 2 of the Protocol.
In summary, it seems that the US and other Western Powers are
currently prepared to abandon all the horizontal non-proliferation
benefits to be achieved by the CANWF on the basis of a selective
principle that Central Asian states should not, in theory, be allowed to
call on Russia to defend them with nuclear weapons if faced with external
aggression, even though, in the case of the South Pacific NWFZ or the
proposed denuclearised zone on the Korean Peninsula, America itself
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to defend zonal states
(Australia, South Korea) against external aggression, and even though
America itself has called for zones to be consistent with existing security
arrangements.
Despite the apparent contradictions, and potentially self-defeating
implications of the US position (in the sense that the region could
potentially become a source to nuclear material exports to US adversaries
and non-state groups), the other nuclear powers, with the exception of
China, must also bear some responsibility for the impasse. Russia could
easily have alleviated American and other Western power concerns by
agreeing not to include Article 12 or, alternatively, by itself making a
clarifying undertaking in its own signature to the treaty protocol that
the military assistance envisaged under the Tashkent Treaty would only
extend to conventional rather than nuclear military assistance. Instead,
Russia has insisted on securing what it sees as a diplomatic victory over
the US rather than taking the opportunity to emphasize its genuine
commitment to the denuclearisation of the Central Asian region.
France and Britain have also recently reversed themselves on the
CANWFZ, apparently putting their interest in maintaining good
15 This criteria, together with the six others, was reiterated by the US State Department
Delegation to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Conference, “Remarks to
the Conference”, 15-16th September 1997, US State Department, available on NTI/Center
for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute website, www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/
shared/canwfz/usstate.htm.
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relations with the US ahead of global interests in pursuing non-
proliferation. Both countries have also been ambivalent on other NWFZ
and related initiatives, such as the Southern Hemisphere NFZ initiative
and non-use assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. China, of all the
nuclear powers, has been the most consistent in supporting NWFZs at
the UN, although has conspicuously failed to take confidence building
measures in withdrawing nuclear capable missiles from regions close to
proposed new NWFZs.
If the challenges of overcoming intraregional conflicts and tensions,
and the very counterproductive resistance of many of the nuclear weapon
states, are formidable enough, there still remains other major challenges,
not least mobilizing the political will to negotiate new NWFZ treaties.
In all the existing successfully negotiated zones, a key factor has
been the existence of sufficient political will amongst the governments
and diplomats of the regional states to pursue negotiations over extended
periods of time.
In most of the zones, adverse past experiences of nuclear activities
have been a factor in sensitizing governments and their constituencies
to the need for a zone. In Latin America, this was the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis which nearly engulfed the whole world in nuclear
conflagration, and deeply shocked Latin American governments. In the
South Pacific, it was the experience of thirty years of French nuclear
testing from 1966 to 1996 in French Polynesia, including eight years of
testing in the atmosphere, that concentrated the minds of regional states
(Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand) on the need to keep nuclear
weapons out of the region, whether for testing or for war. In Southeast
Asia, previous experiences of wars with superpower involvement, such
as Vietnam War during which the US was reported to have considered
options for using tactical nuclear weapons, coupled with concerns over
nuclear transit through the region, were important factors in ASEAN
first declaring itself a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) in 1971 and then establishing the SEANWFZ in 1996. In
Africa, many governments were initially concerned over French nuclear
testing in Algeria in the early 1960s and later by the South African
Apartheid Regime’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities and eventually
weapons.
In some of the zones, NGO and citizen mobilization has played an
important role in influencing the policies of political parties and
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governments, such as the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
Movement in the South Pacific and its secretariat, the Pacific Concerns
Resource Centre in Fiji. In some of the more recent zones, such as the
African Zone and the Central Asian zone, the UN, its regional centres
(such as the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia
and the Pacific) and its disarmament bodies (including UNIDIR) have
played critical research, consultative and resourcing roles in supporting
the zone negotiations; and, for all zones the UN has provided
international support and legitimation. The tenacity of particular
“champions” or advocates of the zonal approach has been crucial, as in
the case of the Nobel-prize winning Mexican diplomat, Alfonso Garcia
Robles.
Finally, regional organizations, such as the Organization of
American States in Latin America, the South Pacific Forum in the South
Pacific, ASEAN in South East Asia have provided important regional
forums for focusing and facilitating the political will to establish NWFZs.
While the ways in which this political will is generated will differ greatly
from region to region, there is certainly a basis for this in Northeast
Asia, the only region of the world to directly experience the use of nuclear
weapons in war at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and where North Korea
has now tested its first nuclear device.
A further challenge for both existing and new NWFZs will be to
ensure that they keep pace with the rapidly evolving polymorphous
nature of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not just nuclear,
but also in the form of chemical and biological weapons, and the various
vectors of delivery, including missiles and radiological dispersal methods.
Determined proliferators frequently possess more than one kind of
weapon of mass destruction, and more than one modality of delivery.
Opponents of the NWFZ could argue, as Israeli has sometimes argued,
that nuclear weapons are needed as a deterrent against chemical and
biological weapon attacks. This requires both the strengthening of
existing zones to link them in better with binding universal treaties or
conventions prohibiting unconventional weapons of mass destruction
through provisions requiring all member states to ratify the relevant
instruments; and the potential inclusion of controls over delivery systems.
A final challenge is to ensure that the zones have very rigorous and
effective verification, control and compliance provisions and resources
so that all parties can be assured that covert development of nuclear
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weapons is either not possible, or detected in sufficient time and with
sufficient sanctions, to ensure that the security of all zonal states is
protected. Some of the existing zones need strengthening in this area,
with few of the zones established after the Tlatelolco Treaty have
specialized agencies comparable to OPANAL to monitor the zone,
although all do require IAEA safeguards, and the most recent Central
Asia NWFZ has specified the more rigorous IAEA Additional Protocol
safeguards developed following recent examples of undisclosed nuclear
weapon development programs in some NPT signatory countries.
An associated issue is the availability of treaty compliance sanctions,
such as referral of treaty violations to regional bodies or the UN Security
Council. The Latin American Tlatelolco treaty empowers the overseeing
Treaty General Conference to report on violations not only to the Council
of the regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS) but
also to the IAEA and the UN Security Council. The most recent Central
Asian NWFZ, however, is relatively weaker in this area, since its Article
11 merely specifies that disputes over the application of the Treaty “shall
be settled through negotiations or by other means as many be deemed
necessary by the Parties”.
Opportunities
The challenges in establishing new NWFZs are formidable indeed,
but there are some encouraging developments both internationally and
within specific regions, including Northeast Asia, that can facilitate the
conditions and political will needed to develop such zones. These
opportunities include: the discrediting of unilateral and preemptive
approaches to dealing with proliferation and other transboundary security
problems, the renewed interest in multilateral approaches, active
engagement in regional discussions, if not through a regional body than
through externally facilitated mechanisms, such as the Six-Party talks
on North Korea’s nuclear program; and the role of NGOs and civil
society in mobilizing grassroots constituencies and lobbying key political
actors and governments in support of zone establishment.
The chaos and suffering that has ensued from the unilateral US and
allied invasion of Iraq over its alleged possession of weapons of mass
destruction has demonstrated to much of the international community,
and to a majority of the American and British publics, that unilateral
and military approaches are not necessarily the solution to global security
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issues, and could well be counterproductive, even from the viewpoint
of national self-interest. There was no significant al-Qaeda presence in
Iraq before the invasion; now there is such a presence, and the war in
Iraq (together with the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict) has become
a major factor in increased recruitment for al- Qaeda-style networks.
In other key global human security areas, such as climate change and
the threat of pandemics (such as Avian Influenza). it has also become
obviously to many in the international community that only multilateral
approaches will be effective in addressing such problems, and that the
UN and its agencies will be crucial in negotiating and coordinating
adequate global responses.
In the area of arms control and disarmament, the US Bush
Administration, has pursued a highly selective approach as to which
multilateral initiatives it will support, conspicuously failing to support
such major international treaties as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and weakening the verification mechanisms in the Biological Weapons
Convention and proposed conventions on small arms trafficking. It has
also, as we have seen, failed to support both the SEANWFZ and the
new Central Asian NWFZ proposals. However, the advent of a
Democrat-controlled Congress during the present Bush Administration,
and the possibility of a Democratic Administration after 2009, creates
opportunities for a return to a more multilateral approach to
nonproliferation and arms control issues, initially through Congressional
scrutiny and intervention, and, depending on the outcome of the 2008
election, through the executive function. As one of the most powerful
actors in world decision-making, a shift towards more multilateral
approaches in the US could have beneficial effects on both close American
allies, such as Japan and South Korea, and open up more multilateral
avenues through the UN and other regional and international forums.
At a regional level, at least in South Asia and Northeast Asia, there
do seem current processes of dialogue that could yield confidence
building measures, and, potentially, more extensive regional
denuclearisation initiatives. In South Asia, as already mentioned, there
is a bilateral dialogue process on nuclear issues between India and
Pakistan that commenced at the SAARC Meeting in January 24, and a
greater willingness to address the Kashmir issue. In Northeast Asia, the
frustrating and difficult Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear
stance finally yielded some progress in the form of the February 13
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2007 agreement committing the parties to “early denuclearisation of
the Korean Peninsula” and a series of concrete actions that would be
taken within 60 days, including a shut-down of North Korea’s Yongbyon
nuclear facility to be monitored by the IAEA, discussion of a list of all
North Korea’s nuclear programs, including plutonium holdings; bilateral
US-DPRK talks to resolve bilateral issues, with the US beginning the
process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of
terrorism and termination of its trade sanctions against DPRK; bilateral
Japan-DPRK talks aimed at normalizing relations and settling
unresolved matters from past conflicts; and economic, energy, and
humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, including an initial shipment of
50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. While there was a further delay with the
60 day implementation schedule associated with the release of DPRK
funds from a Macau Bank, the release of the funds has recently been
announced, so there should now be no further impediment to
implementation (although past experience with failed Six-Party
negotations suggests the need for caution).
Assuming the February 13 Agreement initial steps are indeed
implemented, there are a number of further promising aspects of the
agreement, particularly the setting up of working groups in such areas
as: (1) denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula; (2) normalization of
DPRK-US relations; (3) normalization of DPRK-Japan relations; (4)
Economy and Energy Cooperation; and (5) Northeast Asia Peace and
Security Mechanism. The last working group is particularly significant
as potentially leading to serious consideration of a wider denuclearisation
arrangement or NEANWFZ treaty for the whole of Northeast Asia,
and potentially also including Mongolia and Taiwan. The involvement
of the three key external nuclear weapon states in the form of the US,
Russia and China offers the possibility of binding negative and positive
security assurances to assure the security of the region against any use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons. With this inclusion of the concept
of a wider Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism as part of the
Six Party regional agenda, there is obviously scope for promoting greater
debate and discussion of wider Northeast Asian denuclearisation
concepts and proposals, such as the Japan Peace Depot/Pacific Campaign
for Disarmament and Security Model Treaty for a Northeast Asia
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone covering the two Koreas and Japan.
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At an international community level, and despite the ambivalence
of some P5 nuclear weapon states, there continues to be strong support
for the NWFZ concept as one (but not the only) element in wider
strategies for achieving eventual nuclear elimination. Recent examples
of this support include the repeated resolutions supporting various forms
of regional denuclearisation and nuclear-free zones at UN General
Assembly meetings, New Agenda Coalition support for the concept,
League of Arab State support, the 2000 Uppsala Conference on Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones, and the Tlatelolco 2005 Conference of Existing
NWFZ member states, the NGO-initiated Global Partnership for the
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) meetings, especially the 2004
Tokyo GPPAC regional meeting, and the continued strong support of
the UN Secretariat and its disarmament organizations. At the 2005
Tlatelolco Conference, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted the
contribution that regional NWFZs made to preventing nuclear
proliferation, and called for the creation of new zones in the Middle
East and Asia.16 This continuing support within the international
community will serve to assist any new region considering or seeking to
implement NWFZ arrangements, whether through diplomatic support,
international recognition, or consultative assistance.
Another important force that can successfully address the challenges
and obstacles in the path of regional denuclearisation and NWFZ
establishment is civil society. Peace and disarmament movements, and
associated NGOs, have fluctuated greatly in size depending on the nature
of specific crises, wars and threats. They have sometimes been very
successful in securing particular arms control advances, like the 1963
Partial Test Ban Treaty outlawing atmospheric testing, the INF ban on
intermediate range missiles, and most recently the Ottawa Convention
outlawing land mines. In the case of at least one NWFZ, the South Pacific
NWFZ negotiated during the Cold War period during 1983-85. Citizen
groups and NGOs (such as the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
Movement) were very effective in lobbying and placing the concept on
the regional agenda of political parties and governments, making
extensive use of model treaties for lobbying and community education.
16 Annan, Kofi, “Secretary-General’s Message to the Conference of States Parties and
Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones”, Tlatelolco, Mexico,
April 26th 2005, reproduced on the Critical Will/WILPF website,
www.reachingcriticallwill.org/political/nwfz/SGcanfwz.html.
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There are now a number of international peace and disarmament NGOs
with extensive technical and lobbying expertise in the arms control field,
including the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation, Monterey institute, Greenpeace
International, IPPNW, the various peace research and conflict prevention
centres, UNIDIR, the International Peace Academy, PCRC, and the
GPACC groupings.
In the particular case of Northeast Asia, there are already very
active NGOs, such as the Northeast Asia GPPAC-affiliated NGOs
which included 50 NGO representatives from Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai,
Hong Kong, Taipei, Vladivostok, Ulan Bator, and Japan at its 2005 Tokyo
United Nations University Northeast Asia Regional Conference.17 The
Northeast Asia GPPAC grouping have developed a Northeast Regional
Action Agenda (“Tokyo Agenda”) which, amongst other initiatives
specifically calls for the establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ,
together with formulation of a Northeast Asia Regional Peace Charter,
and creation of a Northeast Asia Regional Organization, and is working
to promote civil society dialogues across the region on these proposals.18
The civil society initiatives already taken by the GPPAC grouping,
the Peace Depot/PCDS Model NEAWFZ Treaty initiative, and
neighbouring state initiatives, such as Mongolia’s single-state Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone declaration, together with a return to multilateral
approaches in the wider international community, create the possibility
for a very effective NGO-civil society campaign to denuclearize the
Northeast Asian region.
Strategies
The changing context of challenges and opportunities for regional
denuclearisation discussed above suggest a number of specific strategies
or approaches that would be important in both the short term (next
three years) and longer term.
At the UN, it would useful for NGOs to lobby at the 2007 and
2008 for country delegations to the First Committee and General
Assembly for the holding of a Fourth Special Session on Disarmament,
17 Kawasaki, Akira, Disarmament and Conflict Prevention: A Civil Society Perspective,
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and the convening of a new expert group to look at Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones in all their aspects that would then report to this Special
Session. The last such expert study was over three decades ago, and a
new study would enable fresh thinking to be done both by the regional
states and the major powers on the role and contribution of NWFZs. A
long overdue Fourth Special Session would potentially seek a renewed
commitment from the nuclear weapon states to honour their NPT
disarmament obligations as well as addressing the dilemmas posed by
new nuclear states, such as Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea.
Associated studies that might be commissioned for a Fourth Special
Session would be the effects of nuclear war on specific regions, and
more generally on climate. It is doubtful whether the large proportions
of people in some South Asia and Middle East countries who appear to
support their countries’ nuclear weapon ambitions would be so
enthusiastic if they were to fully understand the catastrophic and suicidal
implications of even a limited nuclear war.
Within each proposed NGO region there is obviously a need to
develop support around specific denuclearisation initiatives, such as the
Model NEANWFZ Treaty, at both civil and government levels, using
multitrack government, academic, NGO discussions and forum, as well
as awareness raising campaigns in the relevant constituencies of public
and expert opinion.
More specifically, given the central role of the United States by
virtue of its global power and influence, and the security relationships it
has with states such as South Korea and Japan, there is a specific need
to lobby not only the Administration itself but also the US Congress,
which can now be expected to be somewhat more open to multilateral
arms control initiatives. This might further extend to lobbying and
clarifying the positions on NWFZ issues with prospective presidential
candidates, whether Democrat, Republican or Independent.
There is also a need to mobilize the “Middle Powers” in support of
regional denuclearisation initiatives. The potential of Middle Powers
was demonstrated very clearly in Canada’s hosting of the Ottawa
meetings that culminated in the convention banning land mines. In recent
years, there has been some backtracking on commitment to multilateral
arms control on the part of some middle powers with close links to the
US, such as Canada, Australia and Japan, but the political changes in
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America may well open up possibilities for mobilizing such countries
behind new NWFZ initiatives. Related groupings from which support
could be mobilized include the New Agenda Coalition and the grouping
of existing NWFZ treaty partners.
One concrete possibility might be the convening of a major
conference in a North or Central Asian country that would be hosted
by the existing NWFZ treaty states, and have as a specific focus the
strengthening of existing NWFZs, and the further development of
regional and single state NWFZs in Northeast and Southern Asia.
